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‘What we have seen today is nothing short of disgraceful and a complete whitewash 
by the judiciary in order to protect corrupt and dishonest elements within the police. 
The case of the Craigavon Two will not fade away as is hoped by the establishment 
but it will continue until justice is done and seen to be done’
     Gerry Conlon (RIP) May 2014
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FOREWORD
The evidence that convicted the Craigavon 2 is nothing short of disgraceful.
I have no doubts that if the Craigavon 2 had been tried in a proper court, i.e.! in 
front of a Judge and Jury, no honest Jury would have convicted them.
But sadly we don’t have Proper courts in Northern Ireland, we have Diplock 
courts and it’s only in these courts that witnesses like M, a.k.a Walter Mitty are 
creditable and believable.
These courts also Ignore the corrupt and Illegal Practices of the Police and 
Security Services etc.
It is glaringly apparent to me that the only thing that has changed in Northern 
Ireland is the name of the POLICE.
As the late Gerry Conlon, RIP, said, “This case is not going to go away”.
I only hope and pray that it doesn’t take 15, 20 or more years for the truth to 
come out.
I continue to support John Paul and Brendan.
Paddy Joe Hill
Birmingham Six and Miscarriages of Justice Organisation Founder 
4INTRODUCTION
At approximately 21:45 on the night of Monday 9th March 2009 Police Service 
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officer Constable Stephen Carroll was killed in a 
gun attack in the Lismore Manor area of Craigavon, Co Armagh in the North 
of Ireland. The attack was attributed to the Continuity Irish Republican Army 
(CIRA), a militant Irish republican group opposed to the ‘peace process’ and 
Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in Northern Ireland. In the days that immediately 
followed, Craigavon men Brendan McConville and John Paul Wootton were 
arrested by the PSNI and held on remand until their trial began on 9th January 
2012. Following a nine week trial by a non-jury court both men were found 
guilty and received life sentences – McConville being sentenced to 25 years and 
Wootton to 14 years.1 An appeal against these convictions was subsequently 
thrown out in May 2014.2 The failure of this appeal is not irrefutable evidence 
that justice has been delivered; many miscarriage of justice cases – both 
political and non-political - have failed repeatedly on appeal and have 
eventually been overturned decades later due only to the persistence of those 
wrongly convicted and their supporters rather than any belated epiphany 
within the criminal justice system.3 The Public Prosecution Service (PPS) later 
appealed the purported ‘leniency’ of the sentence handed down to John Paul 
Wootton with the effect that his minimum tariff was increased from 14 years 
to 18 years in October 2014.4 Subsequently the legal teams for both men – 
commonly known as the ‘Craigavon 2’ – made representations to the Court of 
Appeal seeking leave to appeal to the UK Supreme Court in relation to several 
shortcomings in the case. Following this, the Court of Appeal referred the case 
to the UK Supreme Court on several points of law. 
The Court of Appeal duly certified the question:
Whether, in a case which the prosecution is insufficient to establish any 
1 S McCaffery and M McHugh ‘Dissidents Brendan McConville and John Paul Wootton jailed for murder of Stephen 
Carroll’ The Telegraph (Monday 21 May 2012, London).
2 ‘Constable Stephen Carroll murder: Two men lose appeal against convictions’ BBC 29 May 2014 accessed via http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27604844 accessed 14/03/2015 at 14:26.
3 F Belloni and J Hodgson Criminal Injustice: An Evaluation of the Criminal Justice Process in Britain Palgrave (Hampshire, 
2000) p 9.
4 ‘Stephen Carroll murder: John Paul Wootton’s minimum jail term increased’ BBC 14 October 2014 accessed via http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-29609672 accessed 14/03/2015 at 14:31.
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specified role in a crime by the appellant and there is no direct evidence of any 
agreement with those involved in the murder, is it proper to permit the drawing 
of adverse inferences against the appellant by reason of his failure to give 
evidence, such an inference contributing to the conclusion on the totality of the 
evidence that the appellant was beyond reasonable doubt involved in the crime 
in some undefined way? 
Despite this question being certified by the Court of Appeal, on May 19th 2015 
the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal arguing that: 
The application does not raise an arguable point of law of general public 
importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court at this time, 
bearing in mind that the case has already been the subject of judicial decision 
and reviewed on appeal.5 
This latest development comes on the back of growing disquiet about the 
conviction of both men expressed by human rights lawyers, politicians and 
miscarriage of justice campaigners including previous victims such as the late 
Gerry Conlon (‘Guilford 4’) and Paddy Joe Hill (‘Birmingham 6’).
This brief outlines the series of shortcomings in the case that has led 
campaigners to deem it a miscarriage of justice. It has been drawn from 
information within the public domain that was disclosed in open court 
– sources include Justice for the Craigavon 2 campaign literature, court 
documents, witness dispositions and media coverage of the protracted legal 
case. The shortcomings identified herein are therefore on the public record 
for others to substantiate through their own investigation if they so wish. The 
fact that these shortcomings are on the public record, even if deliberately 
omitted in mainstream media coverage of the case, makes the refusal by the 
Supreme Court to look into the conviction of McConville and Wootton all the 
more curious. In evaluating the case it is useful to bear in mind the definition of 
miscarriage of justice proffered in the May Report into the wrongful convictions 
of those convicted for the Birmingham and Woolwich bombings in 1974, which 
states that a miscarriage of justice is a case where ‘something goes seriously 
wrong in the criminal justice process which may have affected the result of the 
5 ‘Supreme Court rejects Winston Rea and Carroll murder appeal bids’ BBC 19 May 2015 accessed via http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-32798174 accessed 20/06/2015 at 13:32.
6trial, even though one cannot be sure that it has done so’.6 Further definitions 
relevant to the Craigavon 2 case include the comments of Mantel LJ in the Court 
of Appeal case of R V Davis, Rowe and Johnson that ‘a conviction may be unsafe 
even where there is no doubt about guilt but the trial process has been “vitiated 
by serious unfairness or significant legal misdirection”’,7 and in the definition 
forwarded by miscarriage of justice academic experts Belloni and Hodgson that 
‘a miscarriage of justice refers to the failure of the criminal process to function 
in such a manner as to achieve outcomes which are considered just’.8 
It should be noted, however, that while the concept of miscarriage of justice 
centres on the issue of process rather than innocence per se, both Brendan 
McConville and John Paul Wooton have continuously and consistently denied 
any part in the killing of Constable Stephen Carroll. This brief, however, makes 
no assertions of either guilt or innocence on the part of the pair but rather 
highlights the processes and factors that legitimately give rise to concern over 
how a verdict of guilt was returned in the case. 
Academic scrutiny of miscarriage of justice cases has accordingly identified 
prevalent ‘unfair processes’ that include the production of unsound forensic 
evidence, non-disclosure of evidence, flawed eye witness testimony and 
mishandling of evidence as characteristics of such cases.9 Each of these ‘unfair 
processes’ have a particular salience in the case of the Craigavon 2 and the 
evidence upon which their conviction was secured. This brief will now elaborate 
on how these ‘unfair processes’ were integral to deeming McConville and 
Wootton guilty.
DISSECTING THE CASE
Bizarrely although Brendan McConville and John Paul Wooton have been 
convicted to life imprisonment at no point has the prosecution case attributed 
a direct role in the killing to either of the accused. Rather the case against the 
pair rests on pure conjecture and an attempt to implicate the pair via joint 
6  J May Report of the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the convictions arising out of the bomb attacks in Guilford 
and Woolwich in 1974 Final Report (1993-94 HC 449).
7 R v Davis, Rowe and Johnson [2001] 1 Cr App R 8 AT [56].
8 Belloni and Hodgson (2000) p1.
9  C Walker ‘Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice’ in C Walker and K Starmer (eds) Miscarriages of Justice: A 
Review of Justice in Error Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2009) p33.
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enterprise on the basis of wholly circumstantial evidence. The conviction of 
both men by a non-jury court on such weak evidential grounds is symptomatic 
of a wider ‘War on Terror’ phenomenon whereby normal legal standards are 
being departed from by a judiciary keen to be seen to respond robustly to the 
threat of ‘terrorism’.10 Historically the unquenchable thirst for swift retribution 
in response to ‘terrorism’ has underpinned miscarriage of justice in the so 
called ‘Irish cases’ of the Birmingham, 6, Guildford 4, Maguire 7 and Judith 
Ward.11 In a post-Good Friday Agreement environment in Northern Ireland and 
in a post-9/11 ‘War on terror’ climate it appears this unsatisfactory situation has 
not subsided. In the following sections this brief will interrogate the litany of 
shortcomings in the process and evidence used to deem Brendan McConville 
and John Paul Wootton guilty. 
WITNESS M 
One of the most concerning aspects of the Craigavon 2 case is the centrality 
of the eye witness testimony of ‘Witness M’ to the case against Brendan 
McConville. Both the character and testimony of M have been consistently and 
seriously called into question from the outset of the initial trial right through to 
the subsequently dismissed appeal. An objective examination of M and their 
contribution to the case is strongly suggestive that this has been well reasoned. 
The first cause for concern regarding the reliability and character of M was 
sparked not by anything they had said but by the questionable manner in which 
they became involved in the investigation. M did not come forward to identify 
Brendan McConville until 11 months after the killing of Carroll, by which stage 
McConville had been held on remand for a number of months and his name 
was widely reported in the media as a suspect in the case. More alarming, 
however, is the fact that M contacted the PSNI to identify McConville in the 
middle of the night when intoxicated. Despite this M would go on to become a 
central pillar of the case against McConville. 
Concerns sparked by the unorthodox manner of M’s approach to the PSNI 
quickly became magnified when his testimony was put under scrutiny. It 
became increasingly evident that his evidence was not only contradictory but 
also unsubstantiated, and in some cases even challenged, by others referred 
10  K Roach and G Trotter ‘Miscarriages of Justice in the War against Terrorism’ (2005) Pennsylvania State Law Review 109 
(4) 967-1041.
11 F Belloni and J Hodgson (2000) p 13. 
8to in his testimony. Every facet of M’s testimony ranging from how he allegedly 
came to encounter McConville on the night to what McConville was wearing 
to trivial matters such as how long he had known McConville fell into question 
upon scrutiny. M testified that he had seen McConville among a group of 
men as he walked with his partner and her child to his parents house on 
the evening of the 9th March. Evidence from Witness Z, father of Witness M, 
cast serious doubt on this account. Z pointed out that M and his parents had 
previously had a serious falling out over M’s partner, thus it was highly unlikely 
M and his partner would have been walking to M’s parents on the evening in 
question. Moreover it transpired that M’s partner’s child was unlikely to have 
been in a buggy as M had claimed due to its age. Perhaps most worryingly is 
the fact that M’s partner, who was present with M on the night in question 
and specifically mentioned in his testimony, failed to corroborate M’s version 
of events. It may not be surprising that the prosecution did not call her as a 
witness but questions must surely be asked as to why she was not spoken to 
by the PSNI until 17 February 2011. Moreover M claimed that on the journey 
to his parents house on the evening in question he had acknowledged the 
on-duty security guard at the Craigavon Recreation Centre as he passed the 
centre. Frank Sheridan, the security guard in question, later testified in court 
that he had no recollection whatsoever of such an event having happened. 
Thus from the outset of his testimony it appears that M’s account is peppered 
with contradiction and called into question by others even on seemingly trivial 
matters.  These initial concerns mark the beginning of a more prevalent pattern 
of obvious shortcomings and contradictions in the testimony of M as his 
evidence grew increasingly unreliable and the ramifications of his questionable 
testimony grew in magnitude. 
The next shortcoming emerges when M’s identification of McConville is closely 
examined. M claimed to have identified McConville wearing a green knee 
length army styled coat with a German logo on it standing among a group of 
men. Accordingly M claimed to have identified McConville among a group of 
5 men from a distance of 16 yards. This assertion was robustly challenged 
by McConville’s legal team who pressed M on the competence of his vision. 
When confronted with this M engaged in a sustained process of denying 
any impairment to his eyesight and the fact that he required glasses. This 
catalogue of lies quickly unravelled when other evidence was presented to 
the court. McConville’s legal team produced a prescription belonging to M 
from an opticians in Lurgan. The prescription confirmed that M did indeed 
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have impaired eyesight and he was confirmed as suffering from Astigmatism 
which affects the ability of the eye to focus and from short sightedness that 
rendered him unable to see things clearly unless they are close to his eyes. 
The likelihood of M identifying McConville was further dismissed by expert 
Prosecution witness Dr Page, a consultant ophthalmologist at the Royal Victoria 
Hospital Belfast, who concluded that someone with M’s condition would not be 
able to identify facial features beyond a distance of 8 yards (Evidence key to the 
defence case which only emerged during cross examination). M had previously 
contended that he had been able to identify McConville from a distance of 
16 yards – evidence established to be medically impossible. Moreover on the 
night of the shooting it was raining quite heavily. This poses further questions 
in relation to M’s ability to identify McConville given the adverse weather 
conditions and the fact that it was also dark. This was reflected in M’s initial 
statement where he confirmed that on the night in question it was ‘lashing’. At 
trial however M changed this, largely to correspond with emerging evidence 
relating to a jacket recovered from John Paul Wootton’s car that was allegedly 
worn by McConville on the night in question (The allegation later changed 
to a more general ‘McConville’s coat’ was used in connection with the attack 
when the original allegation no longer suited the narrative) the coat recovered 
was found to be dry –it was also brown not green (this is elaborated on later 
in the brief in relation to the forensic evidence). With the knowledge that the 
recovered jacket was found to be dry M downgraded his description of the 
weather conditions to ‘it was dark, it was miserable’ and later ‘it was very dull, 
erm, it had rained a little bit, not heavy, just a little drizzle’. Discernible from 
this is M’s suggestibility to be led by other evidence in the case and also his 
penchant for contradicting what he has previously asserted – these would come 
to epitomise his testimony more generally.   
The lack of consistency of M’s testimony in relation to the alleged involvement 
of ‘Person A’ in the attack also provides cause for concern. At varying stages in 
the investigative processes M has offered contradictory evidence. M initially 
claimed that he was 90% certain that A was among the group of men allegedly 
coalescing around Brendan McConville prior to the shooting. M would later 
downgrade this to 50% certain in the interview. Besides concerns over how 
certain M was that A was involved a number of other puzzling contradictions 
on A’s alleged role in the attack followed. At one stage M stated in relation to 
A’s apparent involvement that ‘the dogs in the street knew the guy was there’. 
However on a separate occasion M asserted that:
10
I was actually shocked. I was actually shocked at the time to see him there like. 
I wouldn’t have thought it so I wouldn’t have... involved, yeah I was actually 
shocked to find out that he was there, he was actually there. 
Perhaps most puzzling is the fact that M alleged he had been intimidated by A 
and another person after the shooting yet M reached an agreement with the 
PSNI that A would not be arrested for this. Showing concerning unreliability 
M also back peddled on the identification of A as his intimidator – this alleged 
intimidation took place on his own doorstep but M would later assert that 
he was unable to positively identify A yet would subsequently claim that he 
could identify McConville from a distance proven to be medically impossible. 
In addition to these concerns in relation to the activities of A, the PSNI were 
informed by letter via an anonymous motorist who had driven into the 
aftermath of an almost identical gun attack on the PSNI some two weeks 
previous to the attack that claimed Carroll’s life, the letter spoke of two males 
one identified as bearing the family name of A fleeing the scene bearing an 
assault rifle similar to that used in the Carroll killing. The alleged role of A in 
paramilitary activity in the Craigavon area and their alleged links to events 
on the night Carroll was killed are difficult to reconcile with a state narrative 
that places the blame squarely on McConville and Wootton whilst seemingly 
turning a blind eye to A. Given the continuous stream of revelations about 
the immunity granted to state agents within paramilitary groups in the past, it 
does not stretch credulity do ask if a similar dynamic is at play in the Craigavon 
2 case. (It was asked in court by defence counsel if A was working as a police 
agent. A senior member of the PSNI denied this, but his answer may be 
disingenuous and the defence question asked wrongly. All agents in republican 
paramilitary groups fall under the control of MI5, is A a state agent may have 
been a question to remove this ambiguity.)
In addition to inconsistencies on major aspects of the case against McConville, 
M’s testimony on peripheral matters was completely devoid of any consistency. 
M would claim that he had spent one hour and forty five minutes in his parents 
home yet according to another account given to DCI Harkness by M he had 
returned home by the same route forty minutes later. Moreover according to 
the timings that frame M’s initial account of the incident given to DCI Harkness 
(relating to alleged intimidation by A and another person) M would have 
returned home from his parents home even before the brick used to lure the 
PSNI into the area was thrown. M had also said that when McConville allegedly 
11
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acknowledged him on the night of the shooting two men from the group of 
five had walked away, yet in a later statement M claimed that when McConville 
acknowledged him the other four men were still present. Added to this is the 
glaring inconsistency in the length of time M claims to have known McConville 
which has ranged from all his life to ten years to being barely acquainted with 
him. 
M has also been proven to have financially benefited from his involvement in 
the case. If this fact alone does not raise concern then his evasive approach to 
disclosing any benefits accrued since entering the witness protection scheme 
certainly should. Upon entering the scheme M was obliged to provide the 
PSNI with notification of any outstanding debts he had amassed. Later in the 
investigation it emerged that M had failed to disclose one debt of £10, 800. 
When pressed on this M asserted that at the time it was his understanding that 
all his debt had been cleared – in short this can be read as evidence that the 
PSNI had cleared M’s previous financial debts. In addition to this it transpired 
that M was in receipt of a weekly wage of £210 per week from the PSNI via 
the witness protection scheme. M’s rent and childcare costs are also provided 
for through the scheme. On top of this M has secured loans of £3,250 and 
£2,000 from the PSNI. Furthermore overseas holidays for M and his children 
have also been facilitated by the PSNI. Given the significant advantages that 
M has enjoyed since his participation in the case as the star witness against 
McConville it is baffling that he should claim that he received ‘100% no favours’ 
when asked in court about services rendered to him by the PSNI. That any 
witness integral to a politicised case should be enriched to such an extent 
through their involvement in the case is concerning but when one factors M’s 
penchant for contradiction and prevarication as well as his previous socio-
economic disadvantage and vulnerability through addiction into the equation 
these concerns are amplified. It beggars belief that the often contradictory and 
incoherent evidence of such a vulnerable and demonstrably suggestible person 
would be given credence in a court of law much less act as the primary basis 
upon which guilt was determined. The inability to allow such considerations 
to impact upon the outcome of the case cannot be divorced from the fact that 
the trial was presided over by a single judge (who had at one point bizarrely 
asked prosecution counsel if he could draw an adverse inference relating to 
a particular matter in the case) rather than being subjected to the rigours of 
trial by jury. One may infer that had a jury been afforded the opportunity to 
evaluate and scrutinise M’s testimony the weight and credibility attached to it 
may have diminished somewhat.
12
WITNESS Z
Following the conviction of McConville and Wooton, and in the process of their 
appeal, a witness identified as Witness Z came forward. Z is the father of M and 
offered damning testimony that suggested M was a ‘Walter Mitty’ character 
and a compulsive liar. As alluded to in the previous section, Z single-handedly 
dismantled much of M’s testimony. The emergence of Z initiated a disturbing 
series of events that would call the integrity of the entire criminal investigation 
of the case into question. Z was arrested by the PSNI and taken to Dungannon 
PSNI station which, somewhat conveniently, does not contain video recording 
facilities as Antrim Serious Organised Crime Suite. While in custody the ‘security 
services’ applied pressure on Z to retract their evidence and, even more sinister 
some may argue, tried to coerce Z into framing a human rights lawyer for 
criminal offences. When Z rightly refused to engage in this perversion of justice 
the ‘security services’ threatened to discredit him. This dubious course of action 
was not isolated as it later transpired that the same ‘security services’ had both 
Z and the human rights lawyer in question under covert surveillance.12  On the 
back of this, and given the dangerous precedent of this activity being directed 
against human rights lawyers in the North of Ireland,13 the legal representatives 
of the men were forced to lobby the United Nations for protection. Having 
failed to enlist Z in their campaign of sabotage, the ‘security services’ proceeded 
to make the outlandish claim that defence lawyers for the men had taken Z’s 
affidavit at gunpoint in cahoots with the IRA. The interference of the ‘security 
services’ in the case did not stop there. It is alleged that the ‘security services’ 
had conspired with a prison staff member based at Maghaberry prison to plant 
evidence putting McConville in the frame for targeting the prison governor 
Steve Rodford in McConville’s cell. This can only be seen as an attempt to create 
‘bad character’ evidence in a bid to add notions of weight to the circumstantial 
evidence presented against McConville at trial. Equally concerning is the 
fact that the PSNI team investigating the killing of Carroll were tasked with 
investigating the attempted fit up at Maghaberry rather than the CID based 
as Lisburn as would be normal procedure – as a follow on there remains the 
unexplained matter as to why the PSNI were pushing the Public Prosecution 
Service to have McConville charged in relation to this matter. The activity of 
the ‘security services’ is indeed concerning and points more fundamentally to 
12 C Young ‘Police ‘tried to sabotage’ appeal in constable murder case’ Irish News (Thurs 30 Apr 2013, Belfast) 8.
13 D de Silva ‘The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review’ HMSO (London, 2012).
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the inability of policing accountability bodies in Northern Ireland to hold such 
actors to account, particularly in their activities that are directed against those 
in opposition to the political process in Northern Ireland.14 That they may have 
enlisted the co-operation of those in other state agencies (ie the prison service) 
with a view to influencing the Carroll investigation is further concerning.
THE TRACKING DEVICE
A number of similar shortcomings also emerge upon scrutiny of evidence 
obtained from a tracking device attached to John Paul Wootton’s car. In 
addition to issues of deletion and destruction, there are several general flaws 
in the narrative proffered by the state against John Paul Wootton. According 
to this narrative Wootton served as a ‘getaway driver’ in the aftermath of the 
attack and is alleged to have dropped McConville off at his home following the 
attack – the latter being premised on the fact that Wootton’s vehicle passed by 
McConville’s home on the night in question. When subjected to scrutiny the 
foundations of this state narrative weaken.
Firstly Wootton’s car was not parked in the immediate vicinity of the attack but 
was approximately a quarter of a kilometre away in the middle of an adjacent 
housing estate. Secondly the tracking device attached to the vehicle confirms 
that the car did not leave the area until ten minutes after the attack. This is a 
curious course of action to be taken by an alleged ‘getaway driver’ – instead 
of making a hasty escape as one would assume logical, according to the state 
case armed gunmen lingered openly in the middle of a housing estate ten 
minutes after a gun attack before casually exiting the area. Moreover while 
the state emphasise how Wootton’s vehicle passed close by McConville’s home 
in the aftermath of the attack what it fails to reveal is that due to the layout 
of the area there were only two routes available for Wootton - both of which 
passed near to McConville’s home. In addition to this, claims that McConville 
was dropped off home by Wootton need to be further questioned given that 
the tracking device – capable of detecting when doors are opened and closed 
– failed to indicate that anyone had exited the car near to McConville’s house. 
It must also be noted that the tracking device also failed to place Wootton’s 
vehicle anywhere near the scene of the recovery of a firearm in the aftermath 
14 K Hearty ‘A Shared Narrative? A Case of the Contested Legacy of Policing in the North of Ireland’ (2014) British Journal 
of Criminology 54 (6) 1047-1066.
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of the attack. Basically what has been presented in court as irrefutable evidence 
of Wootton’s role as a ‘getaway driver’ is in fact a mixture of conjecture and 
supposition that fails to substantively point to any conclusion other than 
the rather underwhelming scenario of a young man driving casually around 
the area he lives in. What the evidence actually reveals and what it has been 
manipulated to reveal therefore differ drastically.
Flaws in the narrative proffered by the state are only one aspect of the 
problems with the vehicle and tracking device. When Wootton’s car was 
taken away for forensic examination there was an unexplained break from 
established protocol. Instead of waiting for army technical officers to examine 
the car for viable devices a civilian pick-up company were instead enlisted 
to perform the removal. Given that it would later transpire in court that the 
tracking device had been compromised by the army and/or ‘security services’ 
the suspicion reigns that army technical officers were not called in to examine 
the car as the army had already accessed it prior to removal. The deletion of 
data from the tracking device was later established by an expert witness to 
be deliberate and has remained a curious, unexplained action. One may infer 
that had the data corroborated the argument of the state that Wootton was 
a ‘getaway driver’ then the most logical course of action would have been to 
produce it in court and strengthen the prosecution case. The fact that the data 
was deliberately deleted rather than produced in court is suggestive that the 
evidence did not in fact substantiate the state’s case against Wootton. May it in 
fact have contradicted the state case? Parallels can be drawn with the collapse 
of a case against Lurgan man Ryan McKenna in October 2014. McKenna was 
facing three charges of conspiracy to cause explosions, possessing explosives 
with intent to endanger life or damage property and possession of explosives 
under suspicious circumstances but the case collapsed when the prosecution 
offered no further evidence against the accused.15 It was later revealed by 
McKenna’s solicitor that the collapse of the case stemmed from the destruction 
of SAS briefing notes, radio logs and notebooks related to the event and also 
from the deletion of certain parts of a statement made by a soldier. In both 
cases there is a clear pattern of the ‘security services’ effectively manipulating 
evidence through deletion and destruction to fit with their own version of 
events.
15 ‘Mortar bomb accused is acquitted’ Lurgan Mail 1st October 2014 accessed via http://www.lurganmail.co.uk/news/
local-news/breaking-news-mortar-bomb-accused-is-acquitted-1-6331742 accessed 13/06/2015 at 15:11. 
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Rather than being an inference bordering on the conspiratorial, the precedent 
of the ‘security services’ deleting evidence that compromises their version 
of events does exist. For example it has recently emerged that following the 
shooting of 17 year old Michael Tighe in Lurgan in 1982, the ‘security services’ 
deliberately destroyed a recording of the event extracted from a bugging device 
secreted in the hay shed where Tighe was murdered and Martin McAuley 
wounded and arrested.16 The motivation for destroying the evidence was that 
it belied RUC claims that they only opened fire upon Tighe and McAuley when 
the pair confronted officers while bearing firearms.17 This course of sabotage 
that ultimate resulted in the conviction of McAuley (since quashed) occurred 
with the willing acquiescence and encouragement of senior RUC figures. In a 
similar vein it recently transpired that a weapon used in a loyalist attack on 
Sean Graham’s bookmakers on the Ormeau Road in Belfast in 1992 was said 
to have been lost by the security forces investigating the murders only for it 
to turn up years later as an exhibit in the Imperial War Museum in London.18 
This revelation was accompanied by several others in relation to missing, 
compromised and destroyed evidence in order to protect the identities and 
roles of state agents within paramilitary organisations.19 
This culture of cover-up, conspiracy and sabotage has been the proven modus 
operandi of the ‘security services’ and RUC Special Branch.20 Given the flaws 
in the policing accountability mechanisms in the North of Ireland and their 
16 ‘Martin McAuley: ‘Grave misconduct’ as weapons offence quashed’ BBC 10th September 2014 accessed via http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-29142662 accessed 23/05/2015 at 15:02.
17 V Kearney ‘One of ‘Columbia Three’ has weapons conviction quashed’ BBC 20th May 2014 accessed via http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27493189 accessed 23/05/2015 at 15:04.
18 J Awford ‘Assault rifle used in seven unsolved murders and betting shop raid in Northern Ireland is discovered on 
display at Imperial War Museum exhibition’ Daily Mail 29 May 2015 accessed via http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3102266/Assault-rifle-used-seven-unsolved-murders-display.html accessed 31/05/2015 at 12:34.
19 ‘Britain’s Secret Terror Deals: ‘Truly disturbing’ BBC Panorama allegations of collusion must be fully investigated, 
says Amnesty International’ Belfast Telegraph 29 May 2015 accessed via http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/
northern-ireland/britains-secret-terror-deals-truly-disturbing-bbc-panorama-allegations-of-collusion-must-be-fully-
investigated-says-amnesty-international-31261593.html accessed 31/05/2015 at 12:38.
20 Committee on the Administration of Justice The Apparatus of Impunity? Human Rights Violations and the Northern 
Ireland conflict: A narrative of official limitations on post-agreement investigative mechanisms Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (Belfast, 2015); J Stalker, Stalker (Harrap 1988) 27.
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inability to encompass the reserved matter of ‘national security’,21 one cannot 
discount the possibility that such a culture remains. The latter assertion must 
also be seen in the context of significant institutional crossover from the RUC 
Special Branch into the PSNI.22 If the ‘security services’ and RUC Special Branch 
elements had little qualms about the innocent being murdered in the ‘dirty war’ 
then one may infer that they would similarly have little hesitation about framing 
the innocent amidst current post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ fervour where legislation 
like the Regulatory of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) remains insufficient 
to adequately safeguard against the misuse of Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources (CHIS).23 This latter assertion must be seen in the specific context of 
the Craigavon 2 case whereby a fingerprint retrieved from the AK47 rifle seized 
by the PSNI in a follow up operation was demonstrably proven to not belong 
to either Wootton or McConville but to a third party – a party believed by some 
to be a state agent and to be intricately involved in the commission of the fatal 
attack that claimed Stephen Carroll’s life.
THE BROWN JACKET
The prosecution also offered DNA retrieved from a brown jacket in Wootton’s 
car as part of their case against McConville. The contention of the prosecution 
was that the coat belonged to McConville, had been worn by him during the 
shooting and was later found in Wootton’s car as the ‘get away’ car. The brown 
jacket found in Wootton’s car did indeed contain traces of McConville’s DNA 
but, like much else in the case, this was far from unquestionable evidence of 
McConville’s alleged guilt. 
While the prosecution used the presence of McConville’s DNA to link him to the 
jacket as its owner, McConville offered a competing explanation. McConville 
did not contest that his DNA was found on the coat nor did he contest the fact 
that he had been in Wootton’s car before. Rather McConville asserted that as 
a friend of Wootton he had been in his car on numerous occasions and that 
21 M Beyers, ‘Policing Accountability’ in Committee on the Administration of Justice, Mapping the Rollback? Human 
Rights Provisions of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 15 Years on (Committee on the Administration of Justice 2013) 90; 
Committee on the Administration of Justice, The Policing You Don’t See: Covert Policing and the Accountability Gap Five 
Years on From the Transfer of ‘National Security’ Primacy to MI5 (Committee on the Administration of Justice 2012) 5.
22 CAJ ibid.
23 C Hirsch, ‘Policing Undercover Agents in the United Kingdom: Whether the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
Complies with Regional Human Rights Obligations’ (2001) Fordham International Law Journal 25 (5) 1282.
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this could offer an explanation for how his DNA came to be on the brown 
jacket. McConville’s explanation certainly seemed to chime more strongly 
with the actual DNA evidence than the prosecution’s contention did. There 
was no trace of McConville’s DNA found around the collar, cuffs or in the 
pockets of the brown jacket – something that would be expected if he were the 
habitual wearer of the jacket as its owner. Moreover the relatively low trace of 
McConville’s DNA found on the jacket  (which was approximately 200 cells put 
in context by the fact that 10,000 cells can fit onto a pinhead) suggested that 
it was more conducive to having been found as a result of DNA ‘shedding’ by 
McConville rather than as a result of him owning/wearing the jacket. Simply put, 
it was established in court through questioning of an expert witness that the 
DNA in question could easily have come to have been on the coat as a result 
of a sneeze, shedding of other bodily fluids like saliva or even simply from 
simple skin contact via McConville touching the jacket. Given that McConville 
was a friend of Wootton and had, by his own admission, been in Wootton’s car 
on several occasions the presence of his DNA on the brown jacket could be 
equally, if not more so, attributable to any innocent explanation rather than 
it being there as a result of him wearing the jacket during the attack on the 
PSNI the night Carroll lost his life. An expert witness readily accepted such a 
possibility at trial. The same expert witness concluded that the DNA did not 
establish when the coat was worn, conceding at trial that ‘I cannot say when 
the DNA would have been deposited onto the jacket’. In a further concession 
of the circumstantial nature of the DNA evidence found on the jacket the 
expert witness testified that there were mixed profiles of at least three other 
peoples DNA found on the jacket with this figure potentially rising to as many 
as eight people. Drawn from the expert witness evidence above then it cannot 
be established that McConville even wore the jacket, never mind wore it on 
the night in question. This seriously undermines the prosecution case that 
implicates him in the attack on the basis that he is alleged to have worn the 
jacket on the night in question. 
Other issues arise that also question the value of the brown jacket evidence 
against McConville. When the jacket was retrieved from Wootton’s vehicle it was 
found to be completely dry. Given that there was a considerable down pouring 
of rain on the night of the attack this actuality does not correlate with the 
state assertion that McConville was wearing it while taking part in the attack. 
Moreover when the PSNI searched the homes of McConville and Wootton with 
instructions to seize any items of clothing and footwear that were muddy or 
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wet, they failed to recover any such items. The absence of such items is again 
difficult to tally with the case presented against both men.  It was also conceded 
by the expert witness that gun powder residue found on the jacket may have 
come from a non-firearm source. Even if the residue was from a firearm 
anomalies still persist. For example the residue found on the jacket was not 
of the type that would have been emitted by the rifle used in the attack. If the 
residue was from a firearm it was therefore not from that which had been used 
in the attack thus diminishing its value as evidence of McConville’s involvement 
in the killing.
Perhaps most concerning about the forensic evidence found on the jacket is the 
fact that the prosecution influenced the nature of the tests conducted by the 
expert. Following communication from the prosecution in which they outlined 
that their case was that McConville owned the jacket despite his denials, the 
thrust of the tests conducted by the expert appears to have moved from 
trying to establish who had worn the jacket to comparing the propositions that 
McConville had regularly worn the jacket and subsequently that this reflected 
the prosecution case that McConville owned the jacket.  
Each of these flaws with the forensic evidence is concerning and calls the basis 
for deeming both men guilty into question. Such shortcomings are not new 
to miscarriage of justice cases nor are they confined to the Craigavon 2 case. 
Validation of such concerns can be seen in the view of miscarriage of justice 
experts Russell Stockdale and Clive Walker when they cautioned:
Enduring confidence in verdicts which rely heavily upon forensic science can 
only be achieved if the evidence, and the procedures and results which lie 
behind it, are thoroughly scrutinised, rigorously checked, properly clarified 
and carefully balanced. Clearly, the proper time for all of this arises before the 
verdict is reached and not in a piecemeal fashion afterwards.24
The case has also been notable for extensive non-disclosure of evidence 
through various means. For example large sections of M’s witness statement 
to the PSNI had been redacted. This added to the culture of cocooning M 
from sufficient scrutiny in court and in the public domain – an anonymity 
order protecting M’s identity was issued and an order allowing M to give their 
24 R Stockdale and C Walker ‘Forensic Evidence’ in C Walker and K Starmer (eds) Justice in Error Blackstone Press 
(London, 1993) pp. 75-100 at p.83.
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evidence via video link was granted. No assessment of M’s general character 
could therefore be made nor could any potential contradiction in their account 
be made visible to members of the public aware of such contradiction. The 
failure to allow an open cross examination of M also removed the scope to 
scrutinise their demeanour in court, compounding the more fundamental 
problem of trial by a non-jury court. On the latter point the enormity of this 
problem can be seen through the absurd spectacle of Lord Justice Girvan at 
one point asking a prosecution barrister if he could draw an adverse inference 
against McConville due to the PSNI’s failure to conduct an identification parade 
– something that left the barrister visibly bemused. 
These shortcomings compounded the fact that the prosecution secured a 
Public Interest Immunity Order on over one hundred evidential items relevant 
to Wootton and McConville’s defence. Non-disclosure has been a notable 
factor in several historic miscarriage of justice cases including the Birmingham 
6, Guildford 4 and the wrongful rape conviction of Stefan Kiszko.25 Systematic 
non-disclosure, as seen in the case, can skew the case against the defence and 
in favour of the prosecution yet it is readily defended on ‘national security’ 
grounds.26 In the more recent ‘war on terror’ climate this has allowed a more 
general belief that transparency and rigour should be sacrificed to advantage 
the ‘security services’ at the expense of human rights protections to seep slowly 
into the criminal justice system.27 This has recalibrated the state approach 
from one premised on a ‘rule of law’ model to one reliant on extraordinary 
and exceptional measures and processes to curb the threat of ‘terrorism’.28 
Essentially ‘evidence’ is forwarded by the ‘security services’ but is not presented 
in open court rendering it unchallengeable by the defence or any objective 
party and leaving judges with the distinct impression that they should merely 
accept the word of the ‘security services’ over that of the alleged ‘terrorists’.  
Simplistically one could argue that this equates one part of the state system 
asking another to accept its word on the case without having to substantiate it 
with evidence that is open to scrutiny. In the North of Ireland the most notable 
25 Belloni and Hodgson (2000) p128.
26 P O’Connor ‘Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice’ Evidence’ in C Walker and K Starmer (eds) Justice in 
Error Blackstone Press (London, 1993) pp 101-129 at p.113.
27 P Hillyard, ‘In Defence of Civil Liberties’ in P Scraton (ed) Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent Pluto Press 
(London, 2002) pp. 107-113 at p.112.
28 A Guelke Politics in Deeply Divided Societies Polity Press (Cambridge, 2012) at p.36.
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manifestation of this approach was the non-disclosure of intelligence based 
evidence in the case against Martin Corey who was held on the revoking of life 
licence for almost 4 years before being released conditional to a virtual gagging 
order.  In light of any objective scrutiny (even retrospectively as in the Corey 
case) the potential for abuse of process cannot be dismissed, especially when 
there is an established and well proven record of such abuse in the North of 
Ireland. Moreover the combination of evidential shortcomings in the Craigavon 
2 case is alarming given that empirical evidence is indicative that, as miscarriage 
of justice experts Belloni and Hodgson observe, such factors often underpin 
miscarriages of justice: 
Flawed forensic evidence, the misuse of forensic data by prosecution and 
the withholding of critical forensic evidence from the defence were either the 
main or contributing factors in a number of well known cases of wrongful 
conviction.29
29 Belloni and Hodgson (2000) at p.162.
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CONCLUSION
This brief set out to catalogue the shortcomings in the judicial process used 
to convict Brendan McConville and John Paul Wootton for the murder of PSNI 
constable Stephen Carroll. It is worth reiterating that the purpose of this brief is 
not to assert that McConville and Wootton are innocent or that they are guilty 
but rather its intention is to critique the process through which a verdict of 
guilt was reached. That process has been demonstrably shown to have been 
compromised throughout its duration on many levels including the flaws in eye 
witness testimony, the deliberate destruction of evidence, the systematic non-
disclosure of evidence and the flaws in forensic evidence offered as part of the 
case against the pair.  These procedural shortcomings are framed by broader 
contextual factors that include a general invisibilisation of police wrongdoing 
in a post-Patten climate, the inability of policing accountability mechanisms in 
the North of Ireland to provide the necessary oversight in the areas of ‘national 
security’ and the activities of the ‘security services’ and a more global post-
9/11 ‘War on Terror’ climate where extra-legal and exceptional measures and 
processes are increasingly utilised to combat the threat posed by ‘terrorism’ 
– or as the discourse has recently shifted to ‘extremism’. Shortcomings are 
not an unfortunate aberration in the case but come to more fundamentally 
define the entire case from start to finish. Most concerning is the fact that, 
given the involvement of agencies spanning from the ‘security services’ to 
the PSNI to members of the prison service in the effective subversion of due 
process, interference in the case to secure a guilty conviction has been proven 
to be systematic and contrived rather than coming about as a by-product of 
unfortunate or somehow innocent inadequacies. Were such effort expended 
to secure a guilty conviction in a non-politicised ‘normal’ criminal case there 
would doubtless be serious questions raised of the state agencies involved 
in such a protracted campaign of sabotage and of the judicial process that 
returned a guilty verdict in the face of this dubious conduct. The Craigavon 
2 case is, however, no ordinary case and is symptomatic of the politicised 
context in which it unfolded both locally, nationally and globally. The political 
dimensions to the case, twinned with the historic track record of miscarriage of 
justice in cases of this nature and wider human rights concerns stemming from 
an increasingly ‘free hand’ bestowed on intelligence agencies, merely adds to 
rather than detracting from concerns about the safety of the conviction of the 
men. 
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This brief opened with a quote from miscarriage of justice campaigner and 
champion of the Craigavon 2 case, the indomitable late Gerry Conlon. In 
drawing its conclusion it is apt to also conclude this brief with his remarks:
‘We can’t have innocent people going to jail and 15 years down the line them being 
released and their lives ruined. But you have to have the courage of your convictions 
to stand up for what you believe in and I believe a miscarriage of justice took place 
here on the basis of all the evidence I have read. Would I want someone I know to 
stand trial on this evidence? The answer is no. Everything I have read leads me to 
believe this is a miscarriage of justice. It runs on a parallel with Guildford, Woolwich 
and Birmingham’ 
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CAMPAIGN UPDATE 2016
Seven years after their arrest the Justice for the Craigavon Two campaign continues 
to raise awareness of this gross miscarriage of justice and to fight for the freedom of 
Brendan McConville and John-Paul Wootton. Since May 2015 when the Supreme Court 
rejected an appeal application, legal teams for the two men have continued to fight 
for justice and are in the process of submitting an application to the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (CCRC) and in that process have been considering several recent 
developments including:
JOINT ENTERPRISE 
In February 2016, the Supreme Court declared that a key test imposed by judges in 
assessing guilt in joint enterprise cases – where the accused acts in conjunction with the 
killer but does not strike the blow that causes death – had been incorrectly applied. In 
the case of the Craigavon Two Joint Enterprise was used to secure a conviction and life 
sentences against the two men, even though no role was ever attributed to Brendan or 
John-Paul. Both legal teams are in the process of carefully considering this new legislative 
development.
R V DUFFY, PAUL AND OTHERS (2015)
In October 2015 the case of R v Duffy, Paul and others collapsed after the Crown stated 
that they were “offering no further evidence against any of the accused”. In this case the 
judge ordered that sensitive information about surveillance devices used must be shared 
with the defendants. However the prosecution was unable to comply with the orders and 
the test for prosecution was no longer met. 
In the case of the Craigavon 2, neither legal team was granted access to the tracking 
device technology, technology that was subsequently found to have data purposefully 
deleted shortly after the attack. The crucial difference here is that the Duffy case 
collapsed on the basis of non-disclosure of evidence while the Craigavon 2 case continued 
without disclosure as well as corruption of evidence. Again as with the recen   t changes in 
joint enterprise the legal teams for both Brendan and John Paul will explore the potential 
impact of this ruling.
As the legal teams continue to fight for justice for Brendan and John Paul, we will continue 
to support that fight through increasing public awareness and lobbying for support.  If 
you would like further information on the case or would like to help us please get in touch 
via any of the methods below:
Thank you, Justice for the Craigavon Two
JFTC2 @craigavon2facebook.com/JFTC2
www.jftc2.com
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